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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to
§78-2a-3(h), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellee takes issue with the issues presented by the Appellant.
Specifically, Appellee disagrees that Issue No. 1 presented by the Appellant
is an appropriate issue for the Court, as said Issue was not raised at the time
of the Notice of Appeal nor in the Docketing Statement as required by Rule
9 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Thus, the Appellee believes
that the only issue on appeal is Issue No. 2 as presented in the Appellant's
Statement of Issues Presented for Review.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellate Courts review jurisdictional issues under the " clearly
erroneous" standard. Kamdar & Company v. Larav Company 815 P2d 245
(Ut. App. 1991).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES.
ORDINANCES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-24(6) (1998)
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501, whether or not a
citizen or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any
of the following enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his
personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to
any claim arising out of or related to . . .
(6)

With respect to actions of divorce, separate maintenance, or
child support, having resided, in the marital relationship, within
this state notwithstanding subsequent departure from the state;
or the commission in this state of the act giving rise to the
1

claim, so long as that act is not a mere omission, failure to act,
or occurrence over which the defendant had no control.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Appellee generally agrees with the nature of the case as set forth in
Appellant's brief.
2.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In addition to the Statement of Facts set forth by the Appellant, the
Appellee sets forth the following additional facts:
a.

The parties had irreconcilable differences when they separated
in January of 1989, and although they attempted to reconcile
those differences when they visited each other, they were not
able to do so. See Verified Complaint for Divorce, paragraph
4, (R. at 2 and 3). Also see Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law in RE: Bifurcated Decree of Divorce; paragraph 5, (R.
at 89).

b.

Mr. Lent did sign an affidavit indicating that he has not
engaged in any extra-marital relationship within the state of
Utah (R. at 57 and 58).

c.

Mr. Lent never resided with Mrs. Lent in a marital relationship
except in the state of Idaho, although work/vacation-type trips
did occur in the state of Utah. (R. at 15).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The irreconcilable differences of the parties existed at the time that
Mrs. Lent separated from her husband in 1989 and moved herself to the
state of Utah. Thus, such differences did not arise within the state of Utah.
Additionally, Mrs. Lent's argument that Mr. Lent's alcohol consumption
2

was an irreconcilable difference that occurred within the state of Utah was
objected to at the time of the final hearing, as that was the first time it had
ever been raised in any of the pleadings or proceedings.
The issue of whether the parties resided in the state of Utah in the
marital relationship should not be heard by this Court as it was not
preserved by Mrs. Lent in her notice of appeal nor in her docketing
statement which required her to set forth the issues before this Court.
However, the parties did not reside together in the marital relationship as
contemplated by the statute. Their residence was the state of Idaho.
Intermittent work and/or vacations into a neighboring state do not constitute
"residing together" as the statute requires for the state of Utah to assume
jurisdiction over an entire marital estate.
ARGUMENT
Point 1. There is only one issue raised in this appeal.
Mrs. Lent filed a Docketing Statement dated September 22, 1998. In
the Docketing Statement, Mrs. Lent raised one issue for review in this
appeal. That issue was " Did the trial court err by ruling that Utah does not
have jurisdiction over defendant where acts that created the irreconcilable
differences that existed between the parties and which were relied on in
granting the Decree of Divorce occurred in the state of Utah?" The
Docketing Statement was filed pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, and specifically Rule 9. Rule 9 of those rules requires that all
issues presented by the appeal must be set forth with particularity and that
general conclusions are not allowed. Mrs. Lent's issue in her Docketing
Statement is a particular issue and is the issue on this appeal.
However, in Mrs. Lent's brief she has now raised a second issue
which relates to the parties residing in the marital estate together for
3

purposes of conferring jurisdiction on the Utah court over Mr. Lent, an
Idaho resident. This issue should be not be heard as it was not raised in the
Notice of Appeal or in the Docketing Statement, and was raised for the first
time in Mrs. Lent's brief. This procedural deficiency should operate against
Mrs. Lent and should not be considered by this Court. However, Mr. Lent
will address that issue later in this brief, not as a waiver of the procedural
deficiency, but to address the issue in the event this Court does waive that
procedural deficiency.
Point 2. Jurisdictional standards for asserting long-arm
jurisdiction.
Utah Courts have adopted a two-part inquiry in determining whether
they can exercise personal jurisdiction over non-residents. See Kamdar &
Company v. Laray Company 815 P2d 245 (Ut. App. 1991) and cases cited
therein. First, claims against a non-resident must arise from the activities
enumerated in Utah's long-arm statute, and second, the defendant's contacts
must be sufficient to allow jurisdiction to be exercised without violation of
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
In related situations (not domestic) under the long-arm statute, courts
have frequently stated that under the due process inquiry, a defendant's
contacts with our state must be purposeful; that one avail himself of the
privilege of conducting activities within our state; that he reasonably
anticipated being hailed into court here; and that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See
Burt Drilling. Inc. v. Portadrill 608 P2d 244 (Utah 1980); Anderson v.
American Society of Plastic & Reconstructive Surgeons 807 P2d 825 (Utah

4

1990), Parry v. Ernst Home Center Corporation 7 ?i P2cJ uW (I Hah 198Q);
Kamdar & Company v. Larav Company 815 P2d 245 (Ut. App. 1991).
These directives, when applied to the Lent's domestic situation,
indicate that 1 liali b r i s lunsdiriinn ovn h 1i 1 cim However, to further
justify such holding, a comment from Parry v. Ernst Home Center
Corporation 779 P2d 659 (Utah 1989), is helpful.
The United States Supreme Court stated that additional factors for
inquiry include the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum
state, and the plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief. It must also
"weigh in it's determination "the interstate judicial system's interest
in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the
shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies" Id. 729 P2d at 661.
The Lent's married and lived in Idaho, their assets are there, their
differences or inability to get along arose there Tin,"it, Mrs, I ent moveil out
and came lo 1 'l.ih While Ihey Inecf a little bit to reconcile, it never worked.
Therefore, these parties are divorced. Logic, common sense, and the law all
support the action being done in Idaho, nol I l|,ih

I he I Mali I kstn* ( I 'i tmi t

was correct wini\\ it dismissed the complaint and concluded that as to Mr.
Lent, there was not a sufficient basis to maintain personal jurisdiction over
him in Utah.
The Utah Com t held an evidentiary hearing regarding the issue of
jurisdiction over Mr. Lent. Mrs. Lent had the burden of proving jurisdiction
by a preponderance of the evidence. Kamdar & Company v. Laray
Company K IS l\!d 24> ((It. App. 1991) Her facts do not reach that level of
proof. The lower Court's conclusion that it did not have jurisdiction is not
clearly erroneous, and should

5

Point 3. Irreconcilable differences existed at the time of the
parties' separation in Idaho in 1989.
Mrs. Lent argues that the irreconcilable differences existing between
the parties occurred within the state of Utah. This argument is actually
defeated by her own verified complaint and the final pleadings on the
divorce which was granted. In her verified complaint, and particularly
paragraph 4, she indicates that the parties did develop irreconcilable
differences during their marriage. She admits that she separated in January
of 1989 and moved from Idaho to Utah and that she and Mr. Lent did not
live together as husband and wife thereafter. She indicated in her verified
complaint that they made efforts to reconcile their differences by visiting
each other after their separation in 1989, even though they maintained
separate residences after their separation. Finally, she states that despite
their efforts to reconcile, those irreconcilable differences remained. The
final Findings of Fact are similar in content to the facts she alleged in her
verified complaint. She now would ask this Court to hold that the
irreconcilable differences were committed in this state, and thus confers
upon Utah courts complete jurisdiction to handle the divorce matters.
Under Utah law, irreconcilable differences are not fault-based. See
Haumont v. Haumont 793 P2d 421 (Ut. App. 1990). This raises an issue as
to what acts and whose acts created the irreconcilable differences, as it
relates to Utah's long-arm statute in U.C.A. §78-27-24(6). It is apparent
from Mrs. Lent's pleadings that she had irreconcilable differences with her
husband prior to her separation in January of 1989. At the final hearing
when the Decree of Divorce was granted, she then, for the first time,
testified that Mr. Lent had consumed alcohol within the state of Utah since
their separation and that that was one of the issues that she had for
6

irreconcilable-differences

(h i testimony svns oh|< t ted to on the basis that it

was the first time in the history of the case that she had raised alcohol as an
issue for the divorce. The issue of alcohol consumption was raised for
first time at the hearing when Mr 1 uil w.b, r I hi \ i I .ind could not
defend himself. Furthermore, per her own Verified Complaint, she already
had irreconcilable differences before she ever resided in the stat

Ml

Thus, Mr. Lent's alcohol umsumplinn in llie slale '' f Utah, after separation,
while it may have kept the parties from reconciling, was not a cause of their
irreconcilable differences, which already existed prior thereto

'• -

;i

testimony concerning Ilk iilcohohsni and counsel's objection to the same is
found in the transcript pages 13 -17.
It is noted that in these proceedings, Mr. i cm iielual I \ 11 lei i h> o
motions to dismiss which were heard by the Court. At the first hearing, the
Court denied the motion to dismiss on the basic presumption that Mrs. Lent
had raised the issue of infidelity within i ,

-

..

the

(11 \ I >?v i' A11: o 111»11 s 111 was not raised in the first motion to dismiss, nor even
in the pleadings filed in the second motion to dismiss.
• • •- • Mrs. Lent did raise an issue ol mtidelit; v\ ilhin the state ol Utah. Mi
Lent specifically refuted her allegations and stated that he did not engage in
any extra-marital affair within the state of Utah ever. Mrs. Lent finally
admitted that she could no I pioM iii\ mtidehh in Mir state ol 1 Itah She
makes hearsay statements concerning a birth certificate, which she
acknowledges she could not find. Based upon Mrs. Lent's own admission
that she could not prove an \ infujelih, in the shite nl I Mali, there is no basis
to conclude or determine that an act of infidelity occurred within the state of
Utah giving her grounds for divorce within this state, ii is also n.

<I

the infidelity issue that if nitleeU n IKH) oa unvd outside of Utah, and was
7

used by Mrs. Lent as a grounds for her irreconcilable differences that it, too,
existed at the time the parties separated in 1989, and cannot be used to
confer jurisdiction over Mr. Lent, in the Utah Court.
It is also interesting to note that Mrs. Lent's allegation of infidelity
occurred approximately 35 years ago when the parties were both admittedly
living in the state of Idaho. See record at page 72. It is incongruous with
the principles of personal jurisdiction to allege an act occurring 35 years ago
as the basis for conferring jurisdiction in this state, when after that act, the
parties lived together in the state of Idaho for at least an additional 25 years.
It should not be the place of Utah Courts to allow a party to sit upon an
alleged act for 25 years, move to a neighboring state, and then attempt to
use that act as giving rise to personal jurisdiction in the neighboring state,
being Utah.
Point 4. The parties did not reside together in Utah.
The parties did not reside in the state of Utah in the marital
relationship. This issue was not preserved in this appeal and should not be
heard by this Court. However, the argument is very simple to establish.
The provisions of Utah's long-arm statute as it relates to divorce and found
in Utah Code Annotated §78-27-24(6) were designed to confer jurisdiction
on this Court for parties who actually live in or have lived in this state
together.
If we were to accept Mrs. Lent's argument, then any couple who has
ever been to the state of Utah could later come back, establish their three
month residency, and invoke the jurisdiction of the Court for a divorce. A
couple's contacts with the state could be in the nature of work, temporary
work, as Mr. Lent has done, for vacations as many people travel,
conventions which our state or it's entities host, or any other number of
8

draws that the state

• •. ^. \. c i: ng together. Under Mrs.

Lent's theory, as soon as a man and wife cross the Utah border, they are
residing in our state in the marital relationship. That term should n
construed so broadly

II slumM moie uattnali\ be construed in its logical

sense, and that is in conjunction with an actual residency. It should mean an
intent upon those parties' parts to live and make Utah their home togetu
and signify something more Ih.ir 11M temporary transient situations which
temporary work, conventions, and vacations portray. This is especially true
in the Lent's situation where they openly admit th-n ihnr residence was in
Bannock Coiini) „ stale of Idaho, and has been for not just a few years, but
for, in essence, their entire marital relationship which lasted some 44 years.
It is urged that this Court accept ihe term mi irsideil vi iihni the .
marital relationship" as provided in the long-arm statute to have a similar
meaning, at least as to the time element, as that found in the jurisdictional
requirements of Utah Code Annotated § \\) \ 111) I i n purposes < >f
jurisdiction, the parties should have at least resided in Utah together with an
intent to make this their home for the requisite period of time. Thereafter, if
they choose to move and establis

\ *'*e? < **

< • * ..

„ later

separate, and one or the other move back to Utah, then it would be
appropriate for Utah courts to then assert personal jurisdiction over both of
the parties. To define residence as nieaiiitie less than llns simply opens the
dooi to an abuse of the jurisdictional requirements of the Utah court system
and to an abuse of legal due process.
While the term residence can :tii<I has taken di I lerent meanings in
different situations, it is urged that this Court take the provisions of Title 30
and actual bona fide residence for jurisdictional purposes, combine that \v 1111

9

the long-arm statute and the provisions of residing within this state, and
harmonize them to require not just transitory situations in Utah, but some
type of permanent intent upon the parties to stay here and make this state
both their homes before asserting jurisdiction in a divorce situation.
It is only logical that Idaho handle the divorce issues between these
parties where they resided for over 35 years together before Mrs. Lent
decided to separate from Mr. Lent, and then unilaterally moved to the state
of Utah and made this her permanent home. Mrs. Lent's reliance upon the
Ohio case added in their brief, I believe, is distinguishable simply because it
is a Uresa action for support, and not an initial divorce action with the very
basic provisions of the divorce itself.
CONCLUSION
The District Court was correct in dismissing the plaintiffs complaint
for lack of jurisdiction. The alleged acts giving rise to irreconcilable
differences already existed prior to Mrs. Lent's move to Utah and/or she
could not prove that they even arose within the state of Utah. Thus, the
Utah court does not have jurisdiction over Mr. Lent for acts arising without
the state of Utah leading to irreconcilable differences. Mr. Lent did not
reside in the marital relationship within the state of Utah. These parties
were Idaho residents, and indeed, long-time Idaho residents. His temporary
work in Utah, and Mrs. Lent's visiting him here in a vacation situation does
not rise to the level of residing within the state of Utah for the purposes of
conferring jurisdiction on our Court system.
The District Court was correct in dismissing Mrs. Lent's complaint
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for lack of personal jurisdiction over Mr. Lent. That decision was nol
clearly erroneous, and it should be affirmed on this appeal.
DATED this b^

day of 4-judr

, 1999.
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^LaMar J Win^ard
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
I, LaMar J Winward, certify that on /h^H ^*> , 1999,1 served two
copies of the attached Brief of Appellee upon G. Michael Westfall,
the counsel for the Appellant in this matter, by mailing it to him by
first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following
address:
Mr. G. Michael Westfall
59 South 100 East
St. George, UT 84770
Attorney of Rj
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